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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Brian Matthew Williams 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Accounting 
 
December 2015 
 
Title: Financial Accounting Standards, Audit Profession Development, and Firm-Level 
Tax Evasion 
 
 
In this study I investigate the relation between (1) country-level financial 
accounting standards and audit profession development and (2) firm-level tax evasion. I 
investigate this relation using a dataset compiled by the World Bank that provides an 
estimate of the percent of a firm’s sales reported to the tax authority as well as 
information on local corruption and economic development. This database includes firms 
both with and without externally audited financial statements. After controlling for 
corruption, economic development, rule of law, and other firm, local, and country-level 
variables I find that firms in countries with more rigorous financial accounting standards 
and a more developed audit profession evade less tax and that this effect is stronger when 
firms have externally audited financial statements and thus are more directly influenced 
by the financial accounting standards and level of audit profession development in their 
country. These results have important implications for tax authorities and for other policy 
makers debating whether to dedicate scarce resources to improving their countries’ 
financial reporting environment. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In this study I investigate whether more rigorous financial accounting standards 
and a more developed audit profession are associated with lower levels of a form of tax 
evasion prevalent in many countries, the underreporting of sales.  Firm-level tax evasion 
is an important policy issue that is economically significant, with estimates of tax evasion 
above fifty percent in many low-income countries (Schneider and Ernste 2000; Beck, 
Lin, and Ma 2014).1 The ability to accurately and fairly collect taxes is essential to fund 
legal and social systems and also for the competitiveness of a country’s economy – to 
ensure all firms are treated equally. Identifying institutions and systems that are able to 
reduce tax evasion is therefore important to both academics and policy makers (Beck et al 
2014).  
Greece’s central bank estimates the extent of tax evasion in the country to be 
approximately one-third of its total tax revenue, or about the size of the country’s budget 
deficit (Suroweicki 2011). There are further concerns that the extent of tax evasion in 
countries such as Italy may result in additional sovereign debt crises (Bhatti et al 2011). 
In extreme cases, widespread tax evasion can even help to destabilize a country, leaving 
it vulnerable to unfriendly foreign powers. For example, Stecklow, Piper and Akymenko 
(2014) note that an “examination of the rampant tax and extortion rackets finds that the 
toll on the Ukrainian treasury was so great that the state was mortally weakened, leaving 
it at the mercy of outside powers.”  
                                                 
1 In the United States the non-compliance rate is officially estimated at 14% with $385 Billion in owed 
taxes not remitted to the tax authority (IRS 2007). The IRS estimates that of the $385 Billion in total non-
compliance, $122 Billion is due to evasion related to business income.  
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The setting of this study differs from the majority of concurrent and previous tax 
research in accounting. Much of this research examines large, public, U.S. based 
multinational corporations and uses the data found in these firms’ financial statements to 
investigate corporate tax avoidance, tax sheltering, or income shifting. While these are 
important issues that are deserving of study, both the amount of tax a firm pays relative to 
its pretax income (“tax avoidance”) and how a firm allocates income across different tax 
jurisdictions (“income shifting”) typically involve legal tax planning opportunities. 
Additionally, while tax sheltering is often considered an aggressive activity, even the 
most aggressive tax shelters have some legal basis that the firm or its tax provider uses to 
defend the position. In contrast to prior research, in this study I do not examine U.S. 
based companies and I do not examine tax avoidance, income shifting or tax sheltering. 
Instead I focus in an international context on a cruder and clearly illegal activity, tax 
evasion, in which firms hide sales from tax authorities. By not reporting sales to any tax 
authority, the firm is clearly engaging in a potentially criminal activity with no legal 
basis.2  
There are several avenues through which more rigorous financial accounting 
standards or increased development of the financial audit profession may decrease tax 
evasion. Many developing countries have surprisingly lax financial accounting standards 
as well as surprisingly low levels of audit profession development. For example some 
countries’ financial accounting standards do not require firms to create a statement of 
cash flow or to disclose related party transactions while other countries do not require 
auditors to have been college-educated, do not require auditors to have taken an exam 
                                                 
2 Although crude, this form of tax evasion is extensive in low-income countries, which comprise a large 
portion of my sample. 
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before obtaining professional licensing, and do not require auditor practice reviews. To 
the extent that hiding sales requires deceptive or misleading documentation, more 
rigorous financial accounting standards and a more developed audit profession should 
make creating deceptive or misleading documentation more difficult. There is even some 
evidence that at least in the U.S. setting, the tax authority uses financial statements as an 
additional investigative tool to make sure that firms are remitting the full amount of tax 
required (Bozanic, Hoopes, Thornock, and Williams 2014). More rigorous financial 
accounting standards and a more developed audit profession should lead to improved 
accuracy of financial statements, providing the tax authority with a more accurate 
baseline for comparison.  
However, there are several reasons why more rigorous financial accounting 
standards or increased development of the financial audit profession may not be 
associated with lower levels of tax evasion. First, due to liability concerns auditors are 
most often worried about the overstatement of earnings and hiding sales from the tax 
authority involves the understatement of earnings. Second, financial accounting standards 
and financial auditors are focused on financial income, not tax income. While both 
financial and tax accounting are linked to some extent via economic income, to the extent 
that the tax and financial reporting system in a country differ, financial accounting 
standards and financial auditors may not affect the amount of sales a firm reports to the 
tax authority. Finally, while in the U.S. setting the tax authority examines financial 
statements, in many low-income countries the tax authority may not have the resources or 
expertise required to conduct such examinations or the financial statements themselves 
may not be as readily available. 
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I investigate the relation between financial accounting standards, audit profession 
development and tax evasion using a confidential dataset compiled by the World Bank. 
This dataset contains information on various firm-level attributes including a robust 
estimate of the percent of sales that a firm reported to the tax authorities, which I use to 
measure tax evasion. My final dataset covers approximately 18,000 firm-years from 40 
countries during the years 2002-2006. It includes both public and private firms as well as 
firms of various sizes ranging from a single employee to thousands of employees. 
Crucially for this study, this dataset includes firms both with and without externally 
audited financial statements, providing variation in the degree to which firms are affected 
by their countries’ financial accounting standards and audit profession development.3 
This dataset also contains information on local (within-country) corruption and economic 
development. This information is important as it enables tests to identify the relation 
between (1) financial accounting standards and audit profession development and (2) 
firm-level tax evasion while holding corruption and economic development constant.   
In my empirical tests I find that firms located in countries with more rigorous 
financial accounting standards and a more developed audit profession evade less tax. I 
also find that this relation is strongest when firms have externally audited financial 
statements and are thus more directly affected by the financial accounting standards and 
audit profession development of their country. This result lends confidence that my 
results are indeed related to financial accounting standards and audit profession 
development and not some other correlated and omitted country level variable.  The 
results are robust to a wide variety of control variables, including firm size, firm age, 
                                                 
3 Approximately 54% of the firms in my sample have externally audited financial statements. 
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family ownership, the firm’s tax rate, private ownership, foreign ownership, local 
corruption, crime, country-level corruption and rule of law, country-level economic 
development, and other firm, regional, industry, and country-level control variables.  
Overall, the results show that the accounting and audit quality related to financial 
reporting can play an important role in mitigating firm-level tax evasion. This result has 
important implications for many countries worldwide that are currently struggling with 
detecting and decreasing firm-level tax evasion, particularly developing or low-income 
countries where tax evasion is extensive and the financial reporting environment is often 
not well developed. The dollar amount of tax evasion in developing countries is large, 
with estimates of approximately $285 Billion annually or over eight times the amount of 
annual development aid given by the United States and over twice the amount of annual 
development aid given by all OECD countries combined (Cobham 2005).4 
This study makes an important contribution to the literature on firm-level tax 
evasion. The majority of research on corporate tax avoidance examines large, U.S. based 
firms that have externally audited and verified financial statements and uses the 
information in these firm’s financial statements to examine tax avoidance. In contrast I 
utilize a unique dataset of firms of varying sizes in various countries both with and 
without externally audited financial statements. Furthermore I measure tax evasion 
directly, as the percent of sales a firm reports to the tax authorities and do not rely on a 
firm’s financial statements to measure tax evasion. I add to the nascent literature on tax 
evasion by providing evidence that high-quality financial accounting and auditing have a 
                                                 
4 Using alternate estimation techniques the UNODC and World Bank jointly estimate that developing 
countries lose between $200-320 Billion annually due to tax evasion. The Development minister of 
Germany has estimated the figure at $500 Billion annually.  
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positive secondary effect – they are associated with lower levels of firm-level tax 
evasion. 
This study also contributes to the literature on financial accounting and audit 
quality. Previous research has documented many benefits of high-quality accounting and 
auditing including lower borrowing costs, improved credit ratings, improved performance 
evaluation, more efficient contracting, improved monitoring of managers, more efficient 
resource allocation, improved valuation accuracy, as well as many other benefits. This 
study adds to the literature on accounting and audit quality by providing evidence that 
high quality financial accounting and auditing have an important and economically 
significant benefit that has been previously overlooked – the mitigation of firm-level tax 
evasion.  
This paper has important implications for policy makers debating whether to 
dedicate scarce resources to improving a countries’ financial reporting environment. 
While improving the financial reporting environment has well-documented capital 
market benefits, there are costs involved and many of the countries that may benefit most 
from increased development of the audit profession or more rigorous financial accounting 
standards have very limited resources to devote to these goals. However, by considering a 
potential secondary benefit of an improved financial reporting environment, a decrease in 
firm-level tax evasion and thus an increase in government revenue, the cost benefit-
analysis for these policy makers may shift and devoting resources to improving the 
financial reporting environment may become more appealing.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter II motivates and 
presents the hypotheses. Chapter III presents the sample information. Chapter IV presents 
7 
the research design and results. Chapter V presents the results of sensitivity analysis. 
Chapter VI concludes. 
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CHAPTER II 
PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The Relation between Financial Accounting Standards, Audit Profession Development, 
and Tax Evasion 
Firm-level tax evasion is an important issue, and how financial accounting standards 
and audit profession development relate to firm-level tax evasion is ex-ante unclear.  
On one hand, tax evasion often relies on misleading or false documentation and 
higher financial accounting quality and a more developed financial audit profession 
should lead firms to be less likely to present untruthful or manipulative financial 
statements. For example, Doyle, Ge and McVay (2007) find that firms with worse 
internal controls have lower quality accruals; while Dechow, Ge, Larson and Sloan 
(2011) find that firms with lower accruals quality are more likely to have material 
accounting misstatements. Therefore when accounting quality increases, a firm’s 
financial documents should increase in quality and become less deceptive. To this point, 
Kim et al (2011) argue that firms that avoid taxes are often aided by obfuscation which 
leads to lower quality information environments, and provide evidence that firms that 
engage in higher levels of tax avoidance have increased stock price crash risk. 
Directly related to this study, Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008) investigate firms 
applying IAS in 21 countries and find that firms that implement IAS experience 
improvement in accounting quality. As the measure of financial accounting standard rigor 
in this study is based on the differences between local accounting standards and IAS, I 
would expect that firms located in countries with more rigorous accounting standards 
should have higher financial accounting quality and be less likely to present untruthful or 
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manipulative financial statements. Further evidence that implementing international 
financial reporting standards leads to higher financial reporting quality is provided by 
Beneish, Miller, and Yohn (2014). Beneish et al (2014) investigate the relation between 
mandatory IFRS adoption and subsequent foreign portfolio investment and find that 
increases in foreign investment originate from non-adopting countries, suggesting that 
IFRS adoption reflects improved financial reporting quality rather than increased 
comparability.  
During tax audits, the tax authority often requests documentation and records from 
the firm under investigation. To comply with more rigorous accounting standards, or 
when the audit profession is more developed, firms and their auditors may keep better 
and more extensive documentation. If the firm is presenting false or manipulative 
information to the tax authority, this documentation could be used against them in the 
investigation. For example one aspect of the measure of financial accounting standard 
rigor used in this study is whether the standards in a country have listed disclosure 
requirements for related party transactions. If a firm is using undocumented related party 
transactions to avoid taxes, a type of evasion common in countries with a value-added 
tax, then a more thorough documentation of these transactions should make this method 
of tax evasion more difficult.  
Additionally, as the audit profession within a country matures, auditors generally 
become more independent, more educated, and generally better able to detect fraud. Ege 
(2014) finds that a high quality audit function is associated with lower levels of 
accounting-related misconduct while Michas (2011) provides evidence that higher levels 
of audit profession development leads to higher quality audits in emerging market 
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countries. As hiding sales from tax authorities may involve creating untruthful or 
deceptive documentation (including financial statements), it is possible that when 
financial accounting standards are more rigorous and the audit profession is more highly 
developed firms become constrained from the type of manipulation that enables tax 
evasion. Taken together, these arguments suggest that more rigorous accounting 
standards and a higher levels of audit profession development are associated with lower 
levels of firm-level tax evasion. 
On the other hand, there are several arguments that suggest it is not clear that more 
rigorous financial accounting standards or increased development of the audit profession 
will be associated with lower levels of tax evasion. First, auditors are often incentivized 
to err on the side of assuring that earnings are not overstated and may not focus as much 
attention on understatement. For example, in an investigation of 2,190 SEC Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued between 1982 and 2005, Dechow, 
Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2011) find that out of 7,104 firm-quarters with AAERs, only 175 
or approximately 2.5% are related to the understatement of earnings.5  
Second, auditors are much more likely to be sued for overstatements rather than 
understatements (St. Pierre and Anderson 1984). Therefore auditors may become even 
more focused on overstatements (relative to understatements) as their liability increases. 
Adding to these liability concerns, when financial accounting standards become more 
rigorous and require more detailed reporting it may be easier to point out an auditor 
deficiency in court. As one aspect of the measure of audit profession development used in 
this paper is the level of liability faced by auditors, it may be the case that when the audit 
                                                 
5 The percentage is even smaller when investigating firm-years with an AAER as Dechow et al (2011) find 
that only 38 out of 1,696 or ~2.2% are related to understatement of earnings. 
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profession becomes more developed auditors devote their resources to preventing the 
overstatement of revenue, and do not focus on the understatement of revenue. 
The prior arguments as to why more rigorous financial accounting standards and a 
more developed audit profession may not lead to more tax evasion rely on the assumption 
that the book and tax reporting system within a country are similar. However while book 
and tax accounting are both linked to economic income, to the extent that the tax 
reporting system and the financial reporting system in a country differ it may be that the 
case that more rigorous financial accounting standards and a more developed financial 
audit profession simply have little or no impact on tax accounting and thus a negligible 
effect on the amount of sales that a firm reports to the tax authority. Furthermore, even if 
the tax and financial accounting systems in a country are similar, it may be the case that 
the tax authority may not have the necessary resources or expertise to conduct 
examinations of financial statements, or that the financial statements themselves may not 
be readily available. Both of these arguments suggest that more rigorous financial 
accounting standards and a more developed audit profession may not lead to more tax 
evasion. 
Due to the competing arguments on the relation between (1) financial accounting 
standards and audit profession development and (2) tax evasion, I consider this relation to 
be an empirical question and do not make a directional prediction. This leads to my first 
hypothesis, stated in null form. 
H1: Country-level financial accounting standards and audit profession development 
are not related to firm-level tax evasion. 
 
12 
Externally Audited Financial Statements 
The setting of this study is relatively unique in the sense that it includes both 
public and private firms as well as firms of all sizes, from a single employee to large 
organizations. It also includes firms that have externally audited financial statements and 
those that do not have externally audited statements. While firms without externally 
audited financial statements may be affected by the accounting and audit environment of 
their country, they are not necessarily restrained by these standards. Thus these firms 
have relatively more flexibility in the use of various accounting techniques or methods of 
financial statement preparation that they may use to assist in tax evasion. 
This stands is in contrast to firms that have externally audited financial 
statements, which are subject to the rules and regulations of their reporting environment 
as their external auditor should follow these standards and rules when verifying the firm’s 
financial statements. Thus, firms that have externally audited financial statements should 
be relatively more affected by the financial accounting standards and audit profession 
development of their country relative to firms that do not have externally audited 
financial statements. Utilizing this differential affect leads me to the following 
hypothesis.  
H2: Externally audited financial statements strengthen the relation between (1) 
country-level financial accounting standards and audit profession development 
and (2) firm-level tax evasion. 
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CHAPTER III 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
Sample Selection 
 My sample begins with a dataset provided by the World Bank that includes 
confidential firm-level information (including data on tax evasion) for approximately 
50,000 firms in 98 countries during the years 2002-2006.6 This confidential survey covers 
firms across a multitude of sizes, industries, locations and ownership structures. As noted 
in Beck et al (2014), firm responses to the survey can be considered to be both reliable 
and accurate, as several research papers have verified that firm responses to World Bank 
surveys are closely and directly related to measurable outcomes in corruption, 
expropriation, protection of property rights, corporate financing, operating obstacles, tax 
evasion, investment, performance and growth.7 Participants in the study are promised 
complete and strict confidentiality both personally and for their firms.  
I then merge this data with several publicly available datasets as well as hand-
collected data including the country-level corruption and rule of law indices developed by 
Kaufman et al (2010), the World Bank Development Indicators Database, a measure of 
audit profession development introduced by Michas (2011) and updated by Lamoreaux et 
al (2014) as well as a measure of the quality of country-level financial accounting 
standards developed by Bae et al (2008). In robustness tests, I supplement my dataset 
                                                 
6 This data (The World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys) was accessed by the author through a confidentiality 
agreement with the World Bank. 
 
7 See, for example Johnson et al. (2000), Djankov et al. (2003), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006), Ayyagari, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008, 2010), Barth et al. (2009)) and Beck et al (2014). 
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with hand-collected data on country-level crime rates from the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime. My final merged sample consists of approximately 18,000 firm-year 
observations from 40 countries. Table 1 (see Appendix E for all tables) details my sample 
selection process. 
Measurement of Tax Evasion 
I follow World Bank analysts as well as prior research such as Beck et al (2014) 
and measure tax evasion using responses to the question “Recognizing the difficulties 
many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of 
total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in your area of activity reports 
for tax purposes?”  In line with well-established survey techniques, the World Bank 
intentionally words the question indirectly to solicit more truthful responses.  
It is possible that the wording of the question on tax evasion could result in 
measurement error as answers may reflect perceived industry averages rather than the 
firm’s own behavior.  However there are several reasons to believe that this potential 
measurement error will not bias my results (Beck et al 2014).  First, there is large within 
country-industry variation in the tax evasion response suggesting that firms respond to 
the question based on their own behavior rather than a perceived industry behavior.  
Second, as noted in Johnson et al (2000) when responding to surveys “managers 
presumably most often respond based on their own experiences, and with caution we 
believe the responses can be interpreted as indicating the firms’ own payments.”  Third, 
there is a high correlation between survey responses and the ratio of informal activity to 
GDP. Specifically, Beck et al (2014) use data from Schneider and Ernste (2000) and find 
a correlation coefficient of 65%, which is significant at the 1% level. Beck et al (2014) 
15 
also find a high correlation between survey responses and the tax evasion index 
developed by the World Competitiveness Yearbook. Finally, researchers have found that 
responses to World Bank surveys are directly related to measurable outcomes many areas 
including corruption, expropriation, protection of property rights, corporate financing, 
operating obstacles, tax evasion, investment, performance and growth.  
It is important to note that this is a written survey conducted in a room with both a 
World Bank representative as well as a member of the local private sector such as the 
head of the chamber of commerce or industry association. The World Bank 
representative makes sure the survey is administered consistently across countries and the 
local private sector representative is there to engender the respondent’s trust. The survey 
covers many firm characteristics and the question on tax evasion occurs near the end of 
the survey, after the surveyors and the respondents have had time to develop mutual trust 
and understanding. Government officials and financial institutions are not involved in the 
surveys in any way and neither government officials nor financial institutions are ever 
provided with raw data or any other information that will allow them to identify the 
responses of individual firms (Beck et al 2014). Respondents are promised that their 
responses will remain confidential, and over the ten plus years the survey has been 
conducted no firm or individual has ever been punished for their responses to the survey.  
When conducting the survey a uniform sampling methodology as well as 
standardized survey instruments are used to minimize measurement error and to yield 
data that are comparable across different countries. Sample sizes are between 
approximately 250 and 1,500 companies per country and data are collected using simple 
random or randomly stratified sampling.  The survey’s stated objective is to “better 
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understand conditions in the local investment climate and how they affect firm-level 
productivity. The survey’s stated goal is to “advise government on ways to change 
policies that hinder private establishments like yours and to develop new policies and 
programs that support productivity growth.” 
I use firm’s responses to the World Bank surveys to create two variables related to 
tax evasion. The first is Tax Evasion Ratio, which is calculated as one minus the 
answered numerical response to the survey question on tax evasion. I use this variable to 
measure the extent of firm level tax evasion. The second variable is Tax Evasion 
Indicator, which I code as equal to one if the firm’s Tax Evasion Ratio is a non-zero 
number. I use this variable to measure the incidence of tax evasion. As noted previously, 
both World Bank analysts and prior research have verified that responses to World Bank 
surveys track very closely with actual firm activity.   
There is large variation in the Tax Evasion Ratio across countries. The mean Tax 
Evasion Ratio per country ranges from less than 4% in Spain to 78% in Senegal. There is 
also large variation in the Tax Evasion Indicator, with approximately 18% of firms in 
Spain reporting some level of tax evasion while over 90% of firms in Guinea report some 
level of tax evasion. Overall, the cross-country standard deviation of tax evasion is 0.222. 
While the cross-country variation in tax evasion is large, the within-country variation in 
tax evasion is even greater. I find that standard deviation of within-country tax evasion is 
approximately 0.443, about twice as large as the standard deviation in cross-country tax 
evasion, and consistent with prior research. I exploit this variation in firm-level tax 
evasion in my tests examining the relation between financial accounting standards, and 
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audit profession development, and firm-level tax evasion. Table 2 reports the mean Tax 
Evasion Ratio and Tax Evasion Indicator for each country in my sample. 
Measurement of Financial Accounting Standard Rigor 
My first measure of country-level financial accounting standard rigor is GAAP 
Differences, which is a measure of the number of differences between a country’s 
domestic accounting standards and International Accounting Standards (IAS). This 
measure is developed by Bae, Tan, and Welker (2008), and is based on a survey of 
partners in large accountancy firms in various countries. Bae et al examine 21 important 
rules and guidelines to determine the differences between the accounting standards of a 
given country and IAS standards. A greater absolute value indicates a greater difference 
between a country’s standards and IAS standards (lower accounting quality). Among 
other things, a country is considered to have lower quality accounting standards if its 
standards do not require that firms prepare a statement of cash flows, if the standards 
have no or very limited disclosure requirements for related party transactions, or if the 
standards do not require that firms account for their financial instruments based on 
substance over form. Appendix B provides the complete list of examined IAS 
differences. Table 3 presents the measure of GAAP Differences for each country.  
 My second measure of financial accounting standard rigor is IFRS Adoption, 
which is an indicator variable equal to one in the years a country has adopted the 
mandatory use of International Financial Reporting Standards and zero otherwise. As 
noted in Lamoreux et al (2014), organizations such as the World Bank believe that “IFRS 
adoption contributes to an overall improvement in a country’s financial reporting 
environment” and this idea is “consistent with the literature on IFRS adoption that 
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generally argues IFRS are higher quality than many countries’ domestic accounting 
standards (Defond, Hu, Hung, and Li 2011; Khurana and Michas 2011; Yip and Young 
2012).” I utilize this measure in untabulated robustness tests. 
Measurement of Audit Profession Development 
 I quantify the development of a country’s audit profession using a measure 
developed by Michas (2011) and updated in Lamoreaux, Michas, and Schultz (2014). 
This measure of audit profession development captures four general aspects of the audit 
profession using 13 individual components. Specifically, this measure is designed to 
capture (1) auditor education, (2) auditing standards, (3) auditing independence and (4) 
auditor oversight. Michas (2011) develops this measure using the Reports on Standards 
and Codes (ROSC) from the World Bank and surveys from the International Federation 
of Accountants (IFAC).  A country is considered to have a more developed audit 
profession if, among other things, auditors in that country are prohibited from both 
preparing and auditing a firms a firm’s financial statements, if auditors are required to 
perform on a professional examination before being licensed to practice as an auditor, if 
auditor practice reviews are required, and if college education is required to become a 
licensed auditor. Appendix C provides a detailed description of each of the 13 items that 
make up the audit profession development measure. Table 3 presents the level of audit 
profession development for each country in my sample. 
Control Variables 
 In my analysis I include multiple firm, local, and country-level control variables 
that may explain tax evasion. At the firm level, I control for the size of the firm using the 
log number of employees at the firm as prior research such as Beck et al (2014) has found 
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that smaller firms are more likely to evade taxes.8 I also control for the age of the firm as 
tax evasion may differ for older, more established firms. I control for the percent of the 
firm owned by foreign entities as prior research has shown that foreign ownership is 
related to lower levels of tax evasion. To address differences in incentives and 
opportunities for tax evasion I control for the extent to which the firm views its tax rate or 
the tax administration as a business obstacle. To control for informality I include an 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm was requested to provide informal payments to 
government officials during inspections as well as an additional variable equal to the 
firm’s the total amount of informal payments “to get things done” as a percent of sales. 
Finally, I control for whether the firm exports goods out of its home country, as these 
firms are often subject to additional oversight that may make tax evasion more difficult. 
 At the local level, I include controls for the amount of corruption in the firm’s 
local area. Within a single country, there may be different levels of corruption in different 
areas of the country and these differences are likely related to tax evasion. Including this 
variable should help to control for these differences. I include an indicator variable if a 
firm is in a capital city as well as an indicator variable if the firm is in a small city 
because prior research has found that tax evasion differs for firms in these jurisdictions. 
In robustness tests I also include a control for the strength and objectivity of the court 
system in a firm’s local area. However as data on the court system is missing for 
approximately half my sample, I do not include it in my main analysis.  
 At the country level I include the control of corruption, rule of law, voice and 
                                                 
8 I control for size using the number of employees instead of dollar amount of sales because the amount of 
sales may be endogenous to the percentage of sales reported to the tax authority. Furthermore using the 
number of employees allows for easier comparison across countries as the gross sales amount is a function 
of the strength of the country’s currency and the country’s purchasing power parity.  
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accountability, government effectiveness and quality of business regulation indices 
developed by Kaufman et al (2010). I also include the total tax rate faced by businesses 
within a country, the value-added tax rate faced by businesses in the country, the number 
of taxes firms pay within a country, and the time in hours of the average firm spends 
complying with tax regulations and paying taxes. To control for economic development I 
include the log of total GDP, the log of GDP per capita, the percent of the population 
with access to sanitation facilities and the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births. I 
include industry effects to control for any industry differences in tax evasion, and I 
include year effects to control for any time trends in the data.9 Appendix D contains 
detailed description of all of my control variables, as well as their construction and 
source.   
Table 4 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in my analysis. 
Similar to prior research such as Beck et al (2014) I find that the average firm in my 
sample avoids reporting approximately 20% of its sales to the tax authority and that 
overall approximately one-third of firms in my sample commit a non-zero amount of tax 
evasion in the form of underreporting of sales to the tax authority. I also find the mean 
GAAP Differences is approximately -9.1 indicating that the average firm in my sample is 
located in a country with financial accounting standards that deviate from IAS best 
practices on over 9 of the 21 potential attributes. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Inferences are unchanged when using an alternate specification that includes Country * Year fixed effects 
to control for “confounding time-variant factors related to either global business cycles or changes within 
countries.” (Beck et al 2014) 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS 
Research Design 
To investigate the relation between financial accounting standards, audit 
profession development and the extent of firm-level tax evasion I run several empirical 
tests using my combined dataset. I start first with the following base regression. 
Tax_Evasionijlkt = + βAA_Qualityi + γFirm_Controlsj + δLocal_Controlsl  
                     + ζCountry_Controlsi + ηIndustryk + ϑYeart + ijlkt                                       (1) 
Where Tax_Evasion is the Tax Evasion Ratio as reported by firm j in local area l 
in country i and industry k in year t. A detailed description of the Tax_Evasion variable is 
found in Appendix A. AA_Quality is either a measure of the rigor of a country’s financial 
accounting standards or of development of its audit profession. Appendices B and C 
provide detailed descriptions of the measures of AA_Quality.  
Firm_Controls is a vector of firm controls including the log number of 
employees, firm age, the percent of the firm owned by foreign investors, whether the firm 
is an exporter, the firm’s response to a survey question on how severe an obstacle its tax 
rate is to the growth and operation of its business, the firm’s response to a survey 
question on how severe an obstacle the tax administration is to the growth and operation 
if its business, an indicator variable equal to one if informal payments are requested of 
the firm, and total informal payments as a percent of sales. 
 Local_Controls is a vector of local control variables including the amount of 
corruption in the local area, an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is located in a 
small city, and an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is located in a capital city.  
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Country_Controls is a vector of country-level controls related to the country’s tax 
system, the effectiveness of the government and quality of regulation and the country’s 
level of economic development. The controls related to the country’s tax system are the 
value-added tax rate, the total tax rate as a percentage of commercial profits, the amount 
of time required for tax preparation and compliance and the number of taxes in a country. 
The controls related to government effectiveness and quality of regulation are the Rule of 
Law, Control of Corruption, Quality of Business Regulation, Voice and Accountability, 
and Government Effectiveness indices developed by Kaufman et al (2010). The controls 
related to economic development are the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births, the 
percentage of the population with access to sanitation, the country’s total gross domestic 
product in the current year and the country’s per capita gross domestic product in the 
current year. 
Additional controls include Industry, which is a vector of 26 industry indicators to 
control for industry differences and Year, which is a vector of year indicator variables to 
control for any differences across time. Appendix D presents detailed information on the 
source and construction of each variable used in my analysis. 
To the extent that the control variables isolate the effect of financial accounting 
standards and audit profession development from other factors, the coefficients on the 
vector of β variables should provide an estimate of the effect of these variables on firm-
level tax evasion. However, identification is often a difficult task in international 
accounting research. Despite my best efforts and the myriad of the firm, local, country, 
industry and year controls in equation (1), there exists the possibility the coefficients on β 
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do not reflect the rigor of financial accounting standards or audit profession development 
in a country but rather reflect some other correlated, omitted country-level variable.  
I attempt to address this possibility by identifying a subset of firms within a 
country that are differentially affected by the quality of the accounting standards and 
audit environment. My sample includes firms of all types – public and private, large and 
small, foreign and locally owned, firms closely held by families and firms with disperse 
ownership. Crucially for this study, my sample also includes both firms that have 
financial statements that are audited by an external auditor as well as firms that do not 
have such statements.10 Approximately 54% of the firms in my sample have externally 
audited financial statements, providing variation in this measure. I hypothesize that 
relative to firms that do not have externally audited financial statements, firms with 
externally audited financial statements will be more affected by the country’s financial 
reporting standards and the quality and level of development of the audit profession in the 
country. I utilize this differential impact as my identification technique in the following 
regression.  
Tax_Evasionijlkt =  + βAA_Qualityi + φAA_Qualityi * External_Auditjt + 
ωExternal_Auditjt  +  γFirm_Controlsj + δLocal_Controlsl + ζCountry_Controlsi   
                    + ηIndustryk + ϑYeart + ijlkt                                                                                           (2) 
Where External_Auditjt is an indicator variable equal to one if firm j has 
externally audited financial statements in year t and zero otherwise. All other variables 
are defined as in equation (1). The interaction of AA_Quality and External_Audit is 
                                                 
10 For the firms that do not have externally audited financial statements, I do not have data on whether it is 
that they do not create financial statements, or whether they have financial statements but these statements 
are not audited. 
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represented by the coefficient on vector φ. Firms that have externally audited financial 
statements should be more affected by the financial accounting standards and audit 
profession development of their country than firms that do not have their financial 
statements examined and verified by external auditors. Since within a country there are 
both firms with and without externally audited financial statements, this differential effect 
enables me to identify the effect of financial accounting quality and audit profession 
development on tax evasion while holding constant other important country-level factors. 
Finally, the indicator variable External_Audit should help to control for the direct effect 
of having externally audited financial statements or any differences between firms that 
have externally audited statements and those that do not.  
Results of Primary Empirical Tests 
 My first hypothesis predicts that there is not a relation between country-level 
financial accounting standards and audit profession development and firm-level tax 
evasion. My second hypothesis predicts that if there is a relation between country-level 
accounting quality and audit profession development and firm-level tax evasion, this 
relation will be strongest for firms with externally audited financial statements. I test 
these hypothesis by estimating equations (1) and (2). Table 5 presents the results of 
estimating these equations with the Tax Evasion Ratio (Extent of Tax Evasion) as the 
dependent variable. Columns 1 and 3 present the results of estimating equation (1), while 
columns 2 and 4 present the results of estimating equation (2).  
I find that after controlling for firm, local and country level variables, that 
country-level financial accounting quality and audit profession development are 
negatively related to the extent of tax evasion. Specifically when estimating equation (1), 
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I find a negative and significant coefficient on Audit Profession Development (column 1) 
and a negative and significant coefficient on GAAP Differences (column 3).11 The 
economic effect is substantial, especially when aggregated over an entire economy as full 
IAS compliance (a fully developed audit profession) is associated with a 6.3% (4.7%) 
decrease in tax evasion.12 Overall, this evidence supports a rejection of the null 
hypothesis in H1 of no relation between financial accounting standards, audit profession 
development and tax evasion. 
  I also find that the negative relation between accounting quality and audit 
profession development and firm-level tax evasion is concentrated in firms that have 
externally audited financial statements. Specifically, when estimating equation (2) I find 
a negative and significant coefficient on Audit Profession Development * Externally 
Audited Financial Statements (column 2) and a negative and significant coefficient on 
GAAP Differences and GAAP Differences * Externally Audited Financial Statements 
(column 4). This evidence provides support for hypothesis H2 and suggests that the effect 
is related to the accounting and auditing related to financial reporting and not some other 
correlated and omitted country-level variable. 
 
                                                 
11 It is important to note that my measure of audit profession development (Michas 2011) becomes more 
positive when the audit profession is more developed, and my measure of financial reporting quality 
(GAAP Differences) is also more positive when financial accounting standards have fewer differences from 
IAS. This is because while I measure the differences from best practices, where more differences means a 
higher number of GAAP Differences I then multiply this by -1 so that a more positive number indicates 
fewer differences and thus higher quality. 
 
12 The direct revenue effect is only one benefit of decreased tax evasion. Perhaps an even greater benefit is 
the increase in the competitiveness of the economy through elimination of unfair advantages to well-
connected firms that benefit from corruption. This benefit is especially important for countries with policy 
goals focused on encouraging economic growth. 
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Differential Effects 
Corruption 
Firms are affected by their external environments. For example Leuz, Nandi and 
Hail (2003) find that firms located in countries with lower levels of investor protection 
are more likely to manage earnings. Additionally, McGuire, Omer and Sharp (2012) and 
Boone, Khurana and Raman (2014) find that firms located in more religious areas have 
fewer financial statement irregularities and avoid less tax, respectively. 
 Similarly, firms located in areas of high corruption should be more likely to 
evade tax. Beck et al (2014) provide evidence to support this contention. If evading tax is 
a well-accepted local practice, then it may take effective outside institutions and 
monitoring to deter tax evasion. In this way, external influences such as high-quality 
accounting and auditing may be more effective at mitigating tax evasion when the local 
area is more corrupt. This leads to the following hypothesis, stated in alternative form. 
H3: The relation between financial accounting standards, audit profession 
development and tax evasion will be stronger for firms in areas with higher levels 
of corruption. 
Closely-Held Firms 
Existing empirical evidence suggests that closely held firms evade more tax than 
firms with a more widely distributed ownership structure. Relative to more widely held 
firms, closely- held firms typically have additional flexibility in management decisions 
and both anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that closely-held firms utilize this 
additional flexibility to avoid taxes (Beuselink, Deloof, and Vanstraelen 2014). If more 
rigorous financial accounting standards and a more developed audit profession are at least 
27 
a partial substitute for external monitoring and limit the flexibility that closely-held firms 
have in their financial reporting then they should be associated with lower levels of tax 
evasion for closely-held firms. Given the additional flexibility inherent in closely-held 
firms and their higher levels of tax evasion it should be the case that applying additional 
monitoring through the accounting and auditing channel has a greater effect on tax 
evasion for closely-held firms.  This leads to the following hypothesis, stated in the 
alternative form: 
H4: The relation between financial accounting standards, audit profession 
development and tax evasion will be stronger for closely-held firms. 
Proximity to Regulators 
Within a country, there are often differences in regulatory scrutiny and 
enforcement and these distances are often related to the proximity to regulators. For 
example Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) provide evidence that the SEC is more likely to 
investigate firms located closer to its offices and suggest that “regulation is most effective 
when it is local.”  
The negative relation between financial accounting standards and audit profession 
development should be more pronounced when the standards are more tightly enforced, 
and the audit profession is more closely monitored. The evidence in Kedia and Rajgopal 
(2011) suggests that this monitoring and enforcement will be greater when the firm is 
located closer to regulators. This leads to the following hypothesis, stated in the 
alternative form.  
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H5: The relation between financial accounting standards, audit profession 
development and tax evasion will be stronger for firms in closer proximity to 
regulators. 
Results – Differential Effects 
Several of my hypotheses involve the interaction of financial accounting 
standards and audit profession development with other variables of interest such as 
corruption, ownership structure, and proximity to regulators. To test these hypotheses, I 
estimate the following equation:  
Tax_Evasionijlkt =  + βAA_Qualityi + φAA_Qualityi * VOI + ωVOIjt                               
                                 +  γFirm_Controlsj + δLocal_Controlsl + ζCountry_Controlsi   
                      + ηIndustryk + ϑYeart + ijlkt                                                                                       (3) 
Where VOI is the variable of interest for that particular hypothesis. Specifically, 
VOI takes the form of either an indicator variable for firms located in an area with high 
levels of corruption, an indicator variable for closely-held firms, or an indicator variable 
for firms located in a capital city (and thus closer to regulators).13 All other variables are 
defined as in equation (1). The interaction of AA_Quality and VOI is represented by the 
coefficient on vector φ. For each given VOI, the coefficient on φ indicates the differential 
effect of financial accounting standards and audit profession development for that 
particular VOI. I also control for externally audited financial statements in the Firm 
Controls vector in the regression. 
                                                 
13 Unfortunately, I do not have data on the location of regulatory offices for the countries in my sample. To 
measure proximity to regulators I rely on the assumption that firms located in a capital city are 
geographically closer to regulators than firms located in other areas of the country.  
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 Table 6 presents the results of estimating equation (3) with the Tax Evasion Ratio 
as the dependent variable and where VOI is equal to an indicator variable equal to one if 
local-level corruption is above the median level, and zero otherwise. Columns 1 and 2 
present the results for level of development the audit profession, and columns 3 and 4 
present the results using the measure of financial accounting standard rigor. Consistent 
with my hypothesis, I find that audit profession development and financial accounting 
standards matter more for firms in areas with high corruption, as I find a negative, 
significant coefficient on the interaction of Audit Profession Development * High 
Corruption as well as negative, significant coefficient on the interaction  of GAAP 
Differences * High Corruption. This evidence suggests that more rigorous financial 
accounting standards and a more developed audit profession play a greater role in 
mitigating tax evasion when firms are located in more corrupt areas. 
Table 7 presents the results of estimating equation (3) with the Tax Evasion Ratio  
(Extent of Tax Evasion) as the dependent variable and where VOI is equal to an indicator 
variable equal to one if a firm is closely-held.14 Columns 1 and 2 present the results for 
Audit Profession Development, and columns 3 and 4 present the results using the measure 
of financial accounting standard rigor, GAAP Differences. Consistent with my 
hypothesis, I find that audit profession development has a significantly more negative 
relation with tax evasion for firms that are closely-held, as I find a negative, significant 
coefficient on the interaction of Audit Profession Development * Closely Held. However 
inconsistent with my hypothesis, I do not find that more rigorous financial accounting 
standards are more negatively related to tax evasion for closely- held firms relative to 
                                                 
14 I classify a firm as closely held if the management team is the largest shareholder in the firm. 
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other firms as I find a negative but insignificant coefficient on the interaction of GAAP 
Differences * Closely Held.  
Table 8 presents the results of estimating equation (3) with the Tax Evasion Ratio  
(Extent of Tax Evasion) as the dependent variable and where VOI is equal to an indicator 
variable equal to one if a firm is classified located in a capital city (and thus closer to 
regulators) and zero otherwise. Columns 1 and 2 present the results for level of 
development the audit profession, and columns 3 and 4 present the results using GAAP 
Differences. Inconsistent with my hypothesis, I do not find that audit profession 
development is associated with differentially lower levels of tax evasion for firms in 
closer proximity to regulators, as I find an insignificant coefficient on the interaction of 
Audit Profession Development * Capital City. However, consistent with my hypothesis, I 
do find evidence that more rigorous financial accounting standards are associated with 
decreased levels of tax evasion for firms in closer proximity to regulators, as I find a 
negative and significant indicator on the interaction of GAAP Differences * Capital City.  
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CHAPTER V 
 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Within Country IFRS Differences 
When calculating GAAP Differences, my measure of financial accounting 
standards quality, I follow Bae et al (2008) and reset the differences between a country’s 
accounting system and IAS to 0 when the country adopts IFRS. However, there exist 
large differences in the implementation of IFRS and these differences may be based on 
the accounting environment within a country. To account for potential across country 
differences in accounting quality even after the implementation of IFRS, I re-rerun my 
tests using my measure of standards quality without resetting a country’s GAAP 
Differences to 0 when the country implements IFRS. The results from these tests are 
consistent with my main analyses. 
Crime 
 Studies such as Grossman (1995) and Alexeev, Janeba and Oxborne (2004) 
suggest that organized crime and the mafia may play a part in tax evasion. If countries 
with less rigorous financial accounting standards and a less developed audit profession 
have more organized crime, and this organized crime is related to tax evasion then it is 
possible that this relation is driving my results. My extensive control variables including 
controls for corruption and informality as well as the interaction with externally audited 
financial statements should at least partially address this concern. However, to provide 
further confidence that my results are not driven by organized crime this I hand-collect 
data on crime rates (per 100,000 population) from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime for 
each sample country and include the log of the crime rate as a control variable in my 
32 
untabulated robustness tests. The results from these tests are consistent with my main 
analyses. 
Court Strength 
 In my main analysis, I control for the rule of law at the country level, as it is likely 
that the both tax evasion as well as the quality of a country’s financial reporting 
environment and development of its audit profession are correlated with rule of law. 
However, as the World Bank data used in this study also has information on local judicial 
strength, in untabulated robustness tests I include this measure use this is a finer control 
for the strength of the local courts. When including this variable in robustness tests for I 
find that the results are consistent with my main analyses. I do not include this variable in 
my main analysis as it is missing for approximately half of my sample. 
IFRS Adoption 
 In untabulated robustness tests, I use IFRS Adoption as an alternative measure of 
country level financial reporting quality where IFRS Adoption is an indicator variable 
equal to one in the years a country has adopted the mandatory use of International 
Financial Reporting Standards and zero otherwise. As noted in Lamoreux et al (2014), 
organizations such as the World Bank believe that “IFRS adoption contributes to an 
overall improvement in a country’s financial reporting environment” and this idea is 
“consistent with the literature on IFRS adoption that generally argues IFRS are higher 
quality than many country’s domestic accounting standards (Defond, Hu, Hung and Li 
2011; Khurana and Michas 2011; Yip and Young 2012).” The results using this measure 
of financial reporting quality are consistent with my main analyses. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Tax evasion is an important policy issue that is economically significant for many 
countries. In this study I use a unique dataset to investigate the relation between (1) 
financial accounting standards and audit profession development and (2) the extent of 
firm-level tax evasion. I investigate this question using a confidential dataset compiled by 
the World Bank that provides an estimation of the percent of sales a firm reports to the 
tax authority as well as information on local corruption. Another unique feature of this 
database is that it includes firms both with and without externally audited financial 
statements. After controlling for corruption, court strength, economic development and a 
myriad of other firm, local and country-level variables I find that firms that in countries 
with more rigorous accounting standards and a more developed audit profession evade 
less tax, and that this effect is strongest when firms have externally audited financial 
statements and thus are more directly influenced by their countries’ financial accounting 
standards and audit profession development.  
The IMF and World Bank have recently noted that tax evasion has a large, 
negative impact on many countries, and that the developing world loses more funds 
annually due to tax evasion than it receives in total development aid.  The evidence in 
this paper suggests that one way developing countries may mitigate firm-level tax 
evasion is to implement more rigorous financial accounting standards and to accelerate 
the development of the audit profession. This result has important implications for policy 
makers debating how to respond to tax evasion in their country and whether to dedicate 
scarce resources to improving their countries’ financial reporting environment.  
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APPENDIX A  
 
MEASUREMENT OF TAX EVASION 
 
 
I measure firm-level tax evasion using the World Bank Private Enterprise Survey. This is a 
confidential survey. The World Bank conducts this survey in approximately 100 countries, 
sampling between 250 and 1,500 companies for country. The data are collected using either 
simple random or randomly stratified sampling.  
 
For the purposes of this study, I follow Beck et al (2014) and measure: 
 
The Tax Evasion Ratio = 1 minus the response to the survey question “Recognizing the 
difficulties many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage 
of total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in your area of activity reports for tax 
purposes?”  
 
The Tax Evasion Indicator = equal to one if the Tax Evasion Ratio is greater than zero, 
otherwise zero. 
      
The Tax Evasion Ratio and Indicator have been used in studies in economics and finance such as 
(Beck et al 2014) as the measure of interest of firm-level tax evasion. The World Bank Private 
Enterprise Survey is a confidential survey. The following is an excerpt from the survey (emphasis 
added).   
 
“The purpose of this survey is to better understand conditions in the local investment climate and 
how they affect firm-level productivity. The goal is to advise government on ways to change 
policies that hinder private establishments like yours and to develop new policies and programs 
that support productivity growth. Your answers should reflect only your experience of doing 
business in your country. Please note that the information obtained here will be treated 
strictly confidentially. Neither your name nor the name of your firm will be used in any 
document based on this survey. “ 
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APPENDIX B 
 
MEASUREMENT OF AUDIT PROFESSION DEVELOPMENT 
 
Reproduced from Appendix B in Michas (2011) 
 
The 13 components are coded by answering the following 13 questions (data source is in 
parenthesis). 
A) Auditor Education: 
1. Are universities’ accounting education curriculum standards the same for all 
universities within a country (ROSC)? 
2. Are auditors required to perform on a professional examination before being 
licensed to practice as an auditor (ROSC)?  
3. Are accountants required to gain professional experience before being licensed as 
an auditor (ROSC)? 
4. Are auditors required to fulfill continuing education requirements on an annual 
basis? (ROSC)?  
B) Auditing Standards: 
5. To what extent are the country’s auditing sources consistent with international 
standards on auditing? This variable is coded 0.00 if there is low consistency, 
0.33 if medium, 0.67 if high and 1.00 if they are exactly the same except for very 
minor differences (ROSC). 
C) Auditor Independence: 
6. Are auditors in the country prohibited from both preparing and auditing a client’s 
financial statements (ROSC)? 
7. What is the level of liability faced by auditors in the country? This variable is 
coded 0.00 if liability is non-existent, 0.33 if low, 0.67 if mid-level and 1.00 if 
high (ROSC). 
8. Are companies’ audit committees responsible for appointing listed companies 
external auditors (ROSC and AARSSF)? 
9. Is auditor rotation required for external auditors of listed companies (ROSC and 
AARSSF)? 
10. Has the audit profession adopted the ethics code of the International Federation 
of Accountings (ROSC)? 
D) Auditor Oversight:  
11. Are auditors required to register with or be licensed by a central governing 
organization, either public or private (ROSC)? 
12. What type of auditor practice reviews are mandatory within the country? This 
variable is coded 0.000 if none are required, 0.5 if a government body or a peer 
auditor conducts the review, and 1.00 if an independent, professional audit 
organization (similar to AICPA for example) conducts the review (ROSC and 
AARSF). 
13. Does an organization within the country consistently issue published audit 
implementation guidelines (ROSC)?  
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APPENDIX C 
 
MEASUREMENT OF GAAP DIFFERENCES 
 
Reproduced from Table 1 in Bae et al (2008) 
The 21 IAS Items Making up the GAAP Difference Measure: 
Item IAS Rules Description – Countries Coded 1  
1 IAS No. 1.7 Do not require a primary statement of changes in equity 
2 IAS No. 12 Do not generally require deferred tax accounting 
3 IAS No. 14 Require no or very limited segment reporting 
4 IAS No. 17 Require no or very limited capitalization of leases 
5 IAS No. 19 Do not have rules for accounting for employee benefit 
obligations  
(other than defined contribution plans in some cases) 
6 IAS No. 19.52 Do not have rules for accounting for employee benefits other 
than  
pensions. 
7 IAS No. 2.36 Do not require disclosure of FIFO inventory cost when LIFO 
is      
used 
8 IAS No. 22.56/38.99 Do not require impairment testing of goodwill or other 
intangibles  
with lives in excess of 20 years 
9 IAS No. 24 Have no or very limited disclosure requirements for related-
party     
transactions 
10 IAS No. 32.18/.23 Do not require that companies account for their financial 
instruments based on substance over form 
11 IAS No. 32.77 Do not require the disclosure of the fair value of financial 
assets and liabilities 
12 IAS No. 35 Do not have rules outlining the treatment of discontinued 
operations 
13 IAS No. 36 Do not have rules calling for impairment testing for long-
term assets, or impairments that are only recorded when 
deemed permanent 
14 IAS No. 37 Do not have specific rules dealing with provisions 
15 IAS No. 37.14 Permit establishing provision when there is no obligation 
16 IAS No. 37.45 Do not have rules calling for the discounting of provisions 
17 IAS No. 38.42 Permit capitalization of research and development costs 
18 IAS No. 38.51 Permit capitalization of some other internally generated 
intangibles  
(e.g. brands) 
19 IAS No. 7 Do not require a statement of cash flows 
20 IAS No. 8.6 Permit a broader definition of extraordinary items 
21 SIC 12 Do not require the consolidation of special purpose entities 
 
GAAP differences is the sum of the number of differences observed in the scores across all-
21 items, measured by country and multiplied by -1. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DATA SOURCES 
 
Panel A: Firm Level Data 
Variable Definition Original 
Source 
Tax Evasion 
Ratio 
“Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face 
in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what 
percentage of total sales would you estimate the 
typical establishment in your area of activity 
reports for tax purposes?” The tax evasion ratio is 
equal to one minus the answered number. 
World Bank 
Private 
Enterprise 
Survey 
 
Financial 
Statement Audit 
Equals one if financial statements of the firm are 
reviewed by an external auditor. 
World Bank 
Private 
Enterprise 
Survey 
Firm Tax Rate 
 
Please tell us if Tax Rates are a problem for the 
operation and growth of your business. If an issue 
poses a problem, please judge its severity as an 
obstacle on a four-point scale where: 0 = no 
obstacle, 1 = minor obstacle, 2 = moderate obstacle, 
3 = major obstacle, 4 = very severe obstacle. 
World Bank 
Private 
Enterprise 
Survey 
Tax 
Administration 
Difficulty 
Please tell us if the Tax Administration is a 
problem for the operation and growth of your 
business. If an issue poses a problem, please judge 
its severity as an obstacle on a four-point scale 
where: 0 = no obstacle, 1 = minor obstacle, 2 = 
moderate obstacle, 3 = major obstacle, 4 = very 
severe obstacle. 
World Bank 
Private 
Enterprise 
Survey 
Informal 
Payment 
Requested 
Was a gift or informal payment ever expected or 
requested during inspections and mandatory 
meetings with officials of the following agencies: 
Tax Inspectorate, Labor and Social Security, Fire 
and Building Safety, Sanitation/Epidemiology, 
Municipal Police, Environmental.  
World Bank 
Private 
Enterprise 
Survey 
Informal 
Payments Total 
(% of Sales) 
We’ve heard that establishments are sometimes 
required to make gifts or informal payments to 
public officials to “get things done” with regard to 
customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. 
On average, what percent of annual sales value 
would such expenses cost a typical firm like yours? 
World Bank 
Private 
Enterprise 
Survey 
 
 
 
  
38 
 
Panel A: Firm Level Data (Continued) 
Variable Definition 
 
Original 
Source 
Firm Age “In what year did your firm begin operations in this 
country?” Firm age is measured as year of survey 
minus year answered. 
World Bank 
Private 
Enterprise 
Survey 
Manager’s 
Education Level 
“What is the highest education level of the top 
manager? 1 = did not complete secondary school; 2 
= Secondary School; 3 = Vocational Training; 4 = 
Some university training; 5 = Graduate Degree 
(BA, BSc, etc.); 6 = Post graduate degree (PhD, 
Masters). Manager’s education level is equal to the 
numerical answer to this question.  
World Bank 
Private 
Enterprise 
Survey 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Percentage of the firm owned by foreign investors. World Bank 
Private 
Enterprise 
Survey 
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Panel B: Local-Level Data (From Firm Responses) 
Variable Definition 
 
Original 
Source 
Local 
Corruption 
“Please tell us if any of the following issues are a 
problem for the operation and growth of your business. 
If an issue poses a problem, please judge its severity as 
an obstacle on a four-point scale where: 0 = no obstacle; 
1 = minor obstacle; 3 = Major obstacle; 4 = Very severe 
obstacle” Local Corruption = answered answer to this 
question when asked about “Corruption” 
World Bank 
Private 
Enterprise 
Survey 
Firm 
Location 
“Where are this establishment and your headquarters 
located in this country?” (Enumerator, please code as 
follows. 1 = capital city; 2 = other city of over 1 million 
population; 3 = city of 250,000 to 1 million; 4 = city of 
50,000 to 250,000; 5 = town or location with less than 
50,000 population. 
World Bank 
Private 
Enterprise 
Survey 
Capital City Firm Location = 1 (capital city) World Bank 
Private 
Enterprise 
Survey 
Small City Firm location = 4 or 5 (city of 50,000 to 250,000 and 
town or location with less than 50,000 population 
World Bank 
Private 
Enterprise 
Survey 
Strength of 
Local 
Judicial 
System 
““I am confident that the judicial system will enforce 
my contractual and property rights in business disputes.” 
To what extent do you fully agree with this statement? 
Do you: 1= Fully disagree; 2= Disagree in most cases; 
3= Tend to disagree; 4= Tend to agree; 5= Agree in 
most cases; 6= Fully agree. Strength of Local Judicial 
System = answered number.  
World Bank 
Private 
Enterprise 
Survey 
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Panel C: Country Level Data 
Variable Definition Original Source 
Audit 
Profession 
Development 
(APD) 
The average of four aspects of a country’s audit 
profession development as developed by Michas 
(2011). Each aspect includes individual components of 
Auditor Education, Auditing Standards, Auditor 
Independence and Auditor Oversight in a Country. See 
Appendix A for details.  
Michas, P. 2011. The 
importance of audit 
profession development in 
emerging market countries. 
The Accounting Review 86 
(5): 1731-1764. 
GAAP 
Differences 
The difference between International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) and a country’s domestic accounting 
standards as compiled by Bae et al (2008) and 
multiplied by -1 so that numbers greater in value (and 
closer to 0) indicate fewer deviations from IAS..  
Deviations from IAS measures the difference between 
IAS and domestic GAAP in 21 key accounting rules. 
The differences are based on a survey of partners in 
large accountancy organizations from more than 60 
countries benchmarking local GAAP rules to IAS rules 
in place as of December 31, 2001. A higher score 
indicates fewer differences between local accounting 
standards and IAS, which I interpret as an indicator of 
lower accounting quality, consistent with Bae et al 
(2008) and Lamoreaux et al (2014) 
Bae, K.H., H. Tan, and M. 
Welker. 2008. International 
GAAP differences: The 
Impact on Foreign Analysts. 
The Accounting Review 83 
(3): 593-628. 
Log(Total Tax 
Rate) 
Log of Total tax rate (proportion of commercial 
profits) 
World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Log(Value 
Added Tax 
Rate) 
Log of the value-added tax rate World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Log of time to 
prepare and 
pay taxes 
(hours) 
Log of time to prepare and pay taxes (hours) World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Log(Total 
number of 
taxes paid) 
Log of the total number of taxes paid by businesses, 
including electronic filing. 
World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Log(GDP) Log of the gross domestic product World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Log(GDP Per 
Capita) 
Log of the gross domestic product per capita World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Crime Log of per 100,000 population total crime rates United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
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Panel C: Country Level Data (Continued) 
Variable 
 
Definition 
 
Original Source 
Rule of Law Measures the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
Higher values mean stronger law and order. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart 
Kraay, and Massimo 
Mastruzzi, 2010, The 
worldwide governance 
indicators: A summary of 
methodology, data and 
analytical issues, Working 
paper No. 5430, World 
Bank Policy Research. 
Control of 
Corruption 
Measures the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites 
and private interests. Higher values indicate better 
control of corruption. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart 
Kraay, and Massimo 
Mastruzzi, 2010, The 
worldwide governance 
indicators. 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Captures perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of  association, and a free media. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart 
Kraay, and Massimo 
Mastruzzi, 2010, The 
worldwide governance 
indicators. 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Measures the quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and  implementation, and the credibility of 
the government's commitment to such policies. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart 
Kraay, and Massimo 
Mastruzzi, 2010, The 
worldwide governance 
indicators. 
Business 
Regulation 
Quality 
Captures perceptions of the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart 
Kraay, and Massimo 
Mastruzzi, 2010, The 
worldwide governance 
indicators. 
Access to 
Sanitation 
Percent of the population with access to sanitation 
facilities.  
World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Infant 
Mortality 
Infant Mortality Rate per 1,000 live births World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
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APPENDIX E 
 
TABLES 
 
 
 
Table 1: Sample Selection 
 
 Firm-Year Obs.  
Number  of 
Countries  
    
Confidential World Bank Survey with non-missing 
data on Tax Evasion 51,201  98 
    
Missing Data for Control Variables (19,645)  (2) 
    
Missing Data for both Audit Profession Development and 
GAAP Differences (13,330)  (56) 
    
Final Number Observations 18,226  40 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Table 2: Extent and Incidence of Tax Evasion 
            Country 
Tax Evasion Ratio 
 (Mean) 
Tax Evasion Indicator  
(Mean) 
1 Albania 0.228 0.650 
2 Algeria 0.275 0.239 
3 Angola 0.509 0.647 
4 Argentina 0.175 0.449 
5 Armenia 0.060 0.270 
6 Azerbaijan 0.137 0.350 
7 Belarus 0.076 0.249 
8 Benin 0.143 0.355 
9 Boznia and Herzegovina 0.208 0.372 
10 Bolivia 0.202 0.427 
11 Botswana 0.476 0.635 
12 Brazil 0.326 0.763 
13 Bulgaria 0.135 0.311 
14 Burkina Faso 0.219 0.554 
15 Burundi 0.157 0.415 
16 Cambodia 0.520 0.765 
17 Cameroon 0.121 0.378 
18 Cape Verde 0.111 0.184 
19 Chile 0.082 0.197 
20 China 0.419 0.102 
21 Colombia 0.171 0.334 
22 Costa Rica 0.284 0.571 
23 Croatia 0.096 0.317 
24 Czech 0.118 0.440 
25 Democratic Republic of Congo 0.376 0.668 
26 Dominican Republic 0.493 0.596 
27 Ecuador 0.241 0.372 
28 Egypt 0.168 0.356 
29 El Salvador 0.208 0.374 
30 Eritrea 0.158 0.215 
31 Estonia 0.050 0.260 
32 Gambia 0.674 0.856 
33 Georgia 0.235 0.489 
34 Germany 0.057 0.446 
35 Greece 0.110 0.489 
36 Guatemala 0.249 0.526 
37 Guinea 0.643 0.910 
38 Guyana 0.262 0.712 
39 Honduras 0.236 0.411 
40 Hungary 0.114 0.384 
41 India 0.269 0.378 
42 Indonesia 0.269 0.440 
43 Ireland 0.038 0.281 
44 Jamaica 0.118 0.223 
45 Jordan 0.126 0.119 
46 Kazakhstan 0.095 0.272 
47 Kenya 0.143 0.391 
48 Kyrgyzstan 0.202 0.442 
49 Laos 0.038 0.146 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 Country Tax Evasion Ratio (Mean) 
Tax Evasion Indicator 
(Mean) 
50 Latvia 0.096 0.318 
51 Lebanon 0.344 0.556 
52 Lesotho 0.171 0.227 
53 Lithuania 0.125 0.224 
54 Macedonia 0.295 0.573 
55 Madagascar 0.065 0.205 
56 Malawi 0.303 0.456 
57 Mali 0.255 0.523 
58 Mauritania 0.470 0.797 
59 Mauritius 0.124 0.212 
60 Mexico 0.237 0.491 
61 Moldova 0.164 0.475 
62 Mongolia 0.369 0.641 
63 Montenegro 0.296 0.380 
64 Morocco 0.039 0.153 
65 Namibia 0.254 0.362 
66 Nicaragua 0.374 0.523 
67 Niger 0.127 0.264 
68 Oman 0.289 0.359 
69 Panama 0.371 0.477 
70 Paraguay 0.192 0.325 
71 Peru 0.184 0.397 
72 Philippines 0.218 0.483 
73 Poland 0.098 0.401 
74 Portugal 0.082 0.370 
75 Romania 0.085 0.299 
76 Russia 0.166 0.389 
77 Rwanda 0.189 0.321 
78 Senegal 0.798 0.737 
79 Serbia & Montenegro 0.177 0.369 
80 Serbia 0.231 0.534 
81 Slovakia 0.080 0.292 
82 Slovenia 0.118 0.389 
83 South Africa 0.092 0.149 
84 South Korea 0.100 0.420 
85 Spain 0.037 0.182 
86 Sri Lanka 0.076 0.330 
87 Swaziland 0.579 0.707 
88 Syria 0.489 0.220 
89 Tajikistan 0.235 0.542 
90 Tanzania 0.410 0.665 
91 Turkey 0.363 0.609 
92 Uganda 0.405 0.589 
93 Ukraine 0.123 0.267 
94 Uruguay 0.147 0.274 
95 Uzbekistan 0.058 0.192 
96 Vietnam 0.094 0.392 
97 West Bank & Gaza 0.129 0.237 
98 Zambia 0.158 0.406 
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 Table 3: Accounting and Audit Quality Measures by Country 
Country 
Audit Profession 
Development (Michas 2011) GAAP Differences (Bae et al 2008) 
1 Albania 0.690 N/A 
2 Argentina 0.280 -14 
3 Azerbaijan 0.280 N/A 
4 Belarus 0.580 N/A 
5 Brazil 0.730 -11 
6 Bulgaria 0.610 N/A 
7 Chile 0.220 -13 
8 China 0.810 -9 
9 Colombia 0.060 N/A 
10 Czech 0.500 -14 
11 Ecuador 0.220 N/A 
12 Egypt 0.450 -9 
13 El Salvador 0.510 N/A 
14 Estonia N/A -7 
15 Germany N/A -11 
16 Greece N/A -17 
17 Hungary 0.740 -13 
18 India 0.610 -8 
19 Indonesia 0.750 -4 
20 Ireland N/A -1 
21 Jamaica N/A N/A 
22 Jordan 0.350 N/A 
23 Kazakhstan 0.650 N/A 
24 Latvia 0.820 N/A 
25 Lithuania 0.500 N/A 
26 Malaysia N/A -8 
27 Mauritius 0.270 N/A 
28 Mexico 0.460 -1 
29 Morocco 0.550 N/A 
30 Pakistan 0.750 -4 
31 Paraguay N/A N/A 
32 Peru 0.400 -1 
33 Philippines 0.910 -10 
34 Poland 0.630 -12 
35 Portugal N/A -13 
36 Romania 0.690 N/A 
37 Russia N/A -16 
38 Slovenia N/A -9 
39 South Africa 0.710 -0 
40 South Korea 0.940 N/A 
41 Spain N/A -16 
42 Thailand 0.790 -4 
43 Turkey 0.600 -14 
44 Ukraine 0.480 N/A 
45 Uruguay 0.200 N/A 
46 Venezuela N/a -5 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Firm Level Variables     
 Tax Evasion Ratio 0.207 0.303 0.000 1.000 
 Tax Evasion Indicator 0.337 0.473 0.000 1.000 
 Firm Tax Rate 1.439 1.425 0.000 4.000 
 Tax Administration Difficulty 1.210 1.357 0.000 4.000 
 Externally Audited FS 0.537 0.499 0.000 1.000 
 Foreign Ownership 9.503 27.120 0.000 100.000 
 Exporter 0.191 0.393 0.000 1.000 
 Log(Firm age) 2.586 0.793 0.000 6.911 
 Log(Firm employment) 3.350 1.631 0.000 11.121 
 Gift Requested 0.040 0.197 0.000 1.000 
 Log(Unofficial Payments)  0.475 0.820 0.000 4.615 
 
Local (Within-Country) Variables     
 Small City 0.220 0.414 0.000 1.000 
 Capital City 0.222 0.416 0.000 1.000 
 Court Strength 3.711 1.470 1.000 6.000 
 Corruption 1.175 1.419 0.000 4.000 
 
Country Level Variables     
 Audit Profession Development 0.577 0.200 0.060 0.940 
 GAAP Differences -9.148 4.304 -17.000 0.000 
 Log(Value Added Tax Rate) 2.278 0.461 0.318 3.183 
 Log(Total Tax Rate) 3.835 0.382 2.219 4.929 
 Log(Time on Taxes) 1.911 0.893 1.600 2.182 
 Log(# of Taxes) 1.400 0.191 0.959 1.790 
 Log(GDP) 24.836 1.931 16.203 31.947 
 Log(GDP per Capita) 7.676 1.185 4.187 12.175 
 Government Effectiveness -0.109 0.605 -1.260 1.730 
 Quality of Business Regulation -0.056 0.698 -1.590 1.540 
 Control of Corruption -0.296 0.636 -2.060 2.590 
 Rule of Law -0.259 0.658 -2.670 2.000 
 Voice and Accountability -0.147 0.801 -1.950 1.610 
 Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000) 27.643 20.416 3.500 105.300 
 Access to Sanitation 73.195 24.027 9.600 100.000 
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Table 5: The Association between Country-Level Financial Accounting Standards, 
Audit Profession Development, and the Extent of Firm-level Tax Evasion 
Tax_Evasionijlkt =  + βAA_Qualityi + φAA_Qualityi * External_Auditjt + ωExternal_Auditjt  +  
γFirm_Controlsj + δLocal_Controlsl + ζCountry_Controlsi  + ηIndustryk + ϑYeart + ijlkt 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
          
Audit Profession Development -0.047** -0.016   
 (-2.26) (-0.60)   
Audit Profession Development * External Audit  -0.050**   
  (-2.12)   
GAAP Differences   -0.003*** -0.001 
   (-3.77) (-1.25) 
GAAP Differences * External Audit    -0.003*** 
    (-3.15) 
Firm-Level Controls     
  Firm Tax Rate 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 
 (1.36) (1.39) (0.66) (0.72) 
  Tax Administration Difficulty 0.006** 0.006** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (2.25) (2.24) (2.95) (3.04) 
  Firm has Externally Audited Financial Statements -0.008 0.018 -0.026*** -0.059*** 
 (-1.61) (1.43) (-5.22) (-4.74) 
  % Foreign Ownership -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.048*** -0.047*** 
 (-6.32) (-6.28) (-6.15) (-6.04) 
  Exporter 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.72) (0.72) (-0.07) (-0.06) 
  Log(Firm Age) -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (-3.03) (-3.06) (-2.67) (-2.70) 
  Log(# of Firm Employees) -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.003* -0.003* 
 (-3.18) (-3.14) (-1.85) (-1.96) 
  Informal Payment Requested? 0.0135 0.013 0.035 0.038 
 (0.46) (0.44) (1.19) (1.30) 
  Informal Payments Total (% of Sales) 0.0543*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
 (16.44) (16.43) (13.48) (13.56) 
Local (Within-Country) Controls     
  Local Corruption 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (5.02) (5.07) (3.90) (3.86) 
  Firm Located in Small City -0.005 -0.005 0.002 0.002 
 (-0.86) (-0.84) (0.39) (0.28) 
  Firm Located in Capital City 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 
 (5.29) (5.32) (4.63) (4.51) 
Country-Level Controls     
  Log(Value-Added Tax Rate) 0.123*** 0.124*** 0.164*** 0.163*** 
 (11.73) (11.74) (11.32) (11.26) 
  Log(Total Tax Rate - % of Commercial Profits) 0.029** 0.031*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 
 (2.39) (2.60) (5.06) (4.73) 
 
    (Continued) 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
  Log(Time on Taxes) -0.179*** -0.170*** -0.043 -0.061 
 (-4.10) (-3.86) (-0.94) (-1.34) 
  Log(# of Taxes) -0.145*** -0.147*** -0.074** -0.073** 
 (-8.07) (-8.17) (-2.24) (-2.21) 
  Government Effectiveness 0.158*** 0.156*** 0.111*** 0.114*** 
 (7.26) (7.20) (4.46) (4.58) 
  Quality of Business Regulation -0.054*** -0.051*** -0.096*** -0.095*** 
 (-4.14) (-3.92) (-5.74) (-5.81) 
  Control of Corruption -0.078*** -0.076*** -0.020 -0.017 
 (-5.62) (-5.48) (-0.94) (-0.79) 
  Rule of Law 0.001 -0.001 0.059*** 0.056*** 
 (0.02) (-0.03) (3.14) (2.96) 
  Voice and Accountability -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.061*** -0.062*** 
 (-5.94) (-5.98) (-5.23) (-5.31) 
  Infant Mortality Rate -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.001 0.001 
 (-5.07) (-4.89) (0.67) (1.11) 
  Access to Sanitation -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-8.21) (-8.17) (-4.49) (-4.18) 
  Log(GDP per Capita) -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.029*** -0.028** 
 (-4.21) (-4.29) (-2.61) (-2.56) 
  Log(GDP) 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (10.75) (10.69) (6.62) (6.51) 
Constant 0.153 0.118 -0.482*** -0.424*** 
 (1.27) (0.97) (-4.32) (-3.73) 
     
Industry Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,502 15,502 14,597 14,597 
R-squared 0.137 0.138 0.167 0.168 
*,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
All p-values are in parentheses and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by country and 
industry. All variables are as defined in Appendix D.  
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Table 6: The Association Between Country-Level Financial Accounting Standards, 
Audit Profession Development and the Extent of Firm-level Tax Evasion: The Role 
of Local Corruption 
Tax_Evasionijlkt =  + βAA_Qualityi + φAA_Qualityi * High_Corruptionjt + ωHigh_Corruptionjt  +  
γFirm_Controlsj + δLocal_Controlsl + ζCountry_Controlsi  + ηIndustryk + ϑYeart + ijlkt 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
Audit Profession Development -0.045** -0.027   
 (-2.21) (-1.16)   
Audit Profession Development * High Corruption  -0.054*   
  (-1.93)   
GAAP Differences   -0.003*** -0.001* 
   (-4.20) (-1.80) 
GAAP Differences * High Corruption    -0.007*** 
    (-6.13) 
Firm-Level Controls     
  Firm Tax Rate 0.005** 0.005** 0.003 0.003 
 (2.06) (2.09) (1.30) (1.32) 
  Tax Administration Difficulty 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
 (2.90) (2.96) (3.26) (2.95) 
  Firm has Externally Audited Financial Statements -0.007 -0.007 -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 (-1.47) (-1.45) (-4.75) (-4.65) 
  % Foreign Ownership -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 (-6.79) (-6.80) (-6.63) (-6.65) 
  Exporter 0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.67) (0.69) (-0.08) (-0.19) 
  Log(Firm Age) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (-3.35) (-3.33) (-3.02) (-3.09) 
  Log(# of Firm Employees) -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (-3.22) (-3.18) (-2.11) (-2.03) 
  Informal Payment Requested? 0.030 0.032 0.060** 0.060** 
 (1.06) (1.14) (2.11) (2.13) 
  Informal Payments Total (% of Sales) 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 
 (17.41) (17.43) (14.17) (14.09) 
Local (Within-Country) Controls     
  High Corruption 0.015*** 0.046*** 0.017*** -0.047*** 
 (2.87) (2.84) (3.33) (-3.78) 
  Firm Located in Small City -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-1.13) (-1.08) (-0.18) (-0.29) 
  Firm Located in Capital City 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 
 (4.60) (4.65) (3.72) (3.65) 
Country-Level Controls     
  Log(Value-Added Tax Rate) 0.133*** 0.131*** 0.175*** 0.176*** 
 (13.13) (12.93) (12.06) (12.18) 
  Log(Total Tax Rate - % of Commercial Profits) 0.027** 0.029** 0.061*** 0.061*** 
 (2.30) (2.42) (4.48) (4.51) 
    (Continued) 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
  Log(Time on Taxes) -0.183*** -0.202*** -0.055 -0.025 
 (-4.22) (-4.53) (-1.23) (-0.57) 
  Log(# of Taxes) -0.146*** -0.143*** -0.085** -0.086*** 
 (-8.15) (-7.95) (-2.57) (-2.62) 
  Government Effectiveness 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.129*** 0.145*** 
 (7.15) (7.15) (5.22) (5.90) 
  Quality of Business Regulation -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.093*** -0.111*** 
 (-3.76) (-3.71) (-5.80) (-6.91) 
  Control of Corruption -0.084*** -0.079*** -0.028 -0.022 
 (-6.16) (-5.66) (-1.38) (-1.05) 
  Rule of Law -0.005 -0.010 0.037** 0.036** 
 (-0.36) (-0.63) (2.27) (2.19) 
  Voice and Accountability -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.057*** -0.049*** 
 (-5.52) (-5.47) (-4.98) (-4.26) 
  Infant Mortality Rate -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.0012 0.001 
 (-4.67) (-4.73) (0.47) (0.81) 
  Access to Sanitation -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-7.93) (-7.82) (-3.78) (-4.02) 
  Log(GDP per Capita) -0.039*** -0.041*** -0.029*** -0.035*** 
 (-4.12) (-4.26) (-2.73) (-3.33) 
  Log(GDP) 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
 (10.86) (11.01) (6.59) (6.30) 
Constant 0.130 0.142 -0.459*** -0.415*** 
 (1.11) (1.21) (-4.18) (-3.77) 
     
Industry Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,502 15,502 14,597 14,597 
R-squared 0.137 0.138 0.135 0.164 
*,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
All p-values are in parentheses and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by country and industry. 
All variables are as defined in Appendix D.  
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Table 7: The Association Between Country-Level Financial Accounting Standards, 
Audit Profession Development and the Extent of Firm-level Tax Evasion: Closely 
Held Firms 
Tax_Evasionijlkt =  + βAA_Qualityi + φAA_Qualityi * Closely_Heldjt + ωClosely_Heldjt  +  
γFirm_Controlsj + δLocal_Controlsl + ζCountry_Controlsi  + ηIndustryk + ϑYeart + ijlkt 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
Audit Profession Development -0.047** -0.039*   
 (-2.26) (-1.85)   
Audit Profession Development * Closely Held  -0.271***   
  (-2.92)   
GAAP Differences   -0.003*** -0.003*** 
   (-3.76) (-3.70) 
GAAP Differences * Closely Held    -0.001 
    (-0.50) 
Firm-Level Controls     
  Firm Tax Rate 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 
 (1.34) (1.32) (0.64) (0.64) 
  Tax Administration Difficulty 0.006** 0.006** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (2.26) (2.28) (2.97) (2.97) 
  Firm has Externally Audited Financial Statements -0.00794 -0.008 -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 (-1.61) (-1.61) (-5.22) (-5.20) 
  % Foreign Ownership -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.048*** -0.048*** 
 (-6.33) (-6.31) (-6.16) (-6.17) 
  Exporter 0.004 0.004 -0.0001 -0.001 
 (0.72) (0.72) (-0.08) (-0.07) 
  Log(Firm Age) -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (-3.04) (-3.07) (-2.70) (-2.69) 
  Log(# of Firm Employees) -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003* -0.003* 
 (-3.12) (-3.11) (-1.77) (-1.78) 
  Informal Payment Requested? 0.014 0.014 0.035 0.035 
 (0.49) (0.47) (1.19) (1.19) 
  Informal Payments Total (% of Sales) 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
 (16.43) (16.42) (13.49) (13.49) 
  Closely Held -0.143 0.148*** -0.170* -0.027 
 (-1.41) (2.60) (-1.86) (-1.20) 
Local (Within-Country) Controls     
  Local Corruption 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (5.02) (4.99) (3.91) (3.91) 
  Firm Located in Small City -0.005 -0.005 0.002 0.002 
 (-0.86) (-0.82) (0.41) (0.41) 
  Firm Located in Capital City 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (5.26) (5.30) (4.62) (4.62) 
Country-Level Controls     
  Log(Value-Added Tax Rate) 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 
 (11.75) (11.73) (11.34) (11.33) 
    (Continued) 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
  Log(Total Tax Rate - % of Commercial Profits) 0.029** 0.031** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
 (2.40) (2.55) (5.10) (5.08) 
  Log(Time on Taxes) -0.177*** -0.184*** -0.039 -0.039 
 (-4.04) (-4.19) (-0.85) (-0.85) 
  Log(# of Taxes) -0.145*** -0.143*** -0.075** -0.075** 
 (-8.05) (-7.96) (-2.25) (-2.25) 
  Government Effectiveness 0.157*** 0.155*** 0.111*** 0.112*** 
 (7.24) (7.12) (4.46) (4.48) 
  Quality of Business Regulation -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.093*** -0.094*** 
 (-4.13) (-4.01) (-5.72) (-5.73) 
  Control of Corruption -0.078*** -0.075*** -0.020 -0.020 
 (-5.63) (-5.35) (-0.93) (-0.93) 
  Rule of Law 0.001 -0.001 0.059*** 0.059*** 
 (0.04) (-0.06) (3.14) (3.12) 
  Voice and Accountability -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.061*** -0.061*** 
 (-5.95) (-5.98) (-5.27) (-5.22) 
  Infant Mortality Rate -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.001 0.001 
 (-5.05) (-4.85) (0.68) (0.70) 
  Access to Sanitation -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-8.20) (-8.14) (-4.50) (-4.50) 
  Log(GDP per Capita) -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.029** -0.029*** 
 (-4.13) (-4.09) (-2.56) (-2.59) 
  Log(GDP) 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (10.69) (10.78) (6.57) (6.57) 
Constant 0.144 0.134 -0.492*** -0.490*** 
 (1.20) (1.11) (-4.41) (-4.38) 
     
Industry Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,502 15,502 14,597 14,597 
R-squared 0.137 0.138 0.167 0.167 
*,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
All p-values are in parentheses and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by country and industry. 
All variables are as defined in Appendix D.  
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Table 8: The Association Between Country-Level Financial Accounting Standards, 
Audit Profession Development and the Extent of Firm-level Tax Evasion: Proximity 
to Regulators 
Tax_Evasionijlkt =  + βAA_Qualityi + φAA_Qualityi * Capital_Cityjt + ωCapital_Cityjt  +  
γFirm_Controlsj + δLocal_Controlsl + ζCountry_Controlsi  + ηIndustryk + ϑYeart + ijlkt 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
Audit Profession Development -0.047** -0.044*   
 (-2.26) (-1.92)   
Audit Profession Development * Capital City  -0.013   
  (-0.45)   
GAAP Differences   -0.003*** -0.002*** 
   (-3.77) (-3.07) 
GAAP Differences * Capital City    -0.003*** 
    (-2.36) 
Firm-Level Controls     
  Firm Tax Rate 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.00179 
 (1.36) (1.37) (0.66) (0.68) 
  Tax Administration Difficulty 0.006** 0.006** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (2.25) (2.25) (2.95) (2.96) 
  Firm has Externally Audited Financial Statements -0.008 -0.008 -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 (-1.61) (-1.61) (-5.22) (-5.18) 
  % Foreign Ownership -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.048*** -0.048*** 
 (-6.32) (-6.33) (-6.15) (-6.16) 
  Exporter 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.72) (0.73) (-0.07) (-0.11) 
  Log(Firm Age) -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (-3.03) (-3.04) (-2.67) (-2.66) 
  Log(# of Firm Employees) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.003* -0.003* 
 (-3.18) (-3.18) (-1.85) (-1.85) 
  Informal Payment Requested? 0.0135 0.014 0.035 0.036 
 (0.46) (0.46) (1.19) (1.22) 
  Informal Payments Total (% of Sales) 0.0543*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
 (16.44) (16.44) (13.48) (13.52) 
Local (Within-Country) Controls     
  Local Corruption 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (5.02) (5.02) (3.90) (3.91) 
  Firm Located in Small City -0.005 -0.005 0.002 0.002 
 (-0.86) (-0.90) (0.39) (0.26) 
  Firm Located in Capital City 0.037*** 0.044*** 0.033*** 0.002 
 (5.29) (2.76) (4.63) (0.16) 
Country-Level Controls     
  Log(Value-Added Tax Rate) 0.123*** 0.124*** 0.164*** 0.161*** 
 (11.73) (11.72) (11.32) (11.18) 
  Log(Total Tax Rate - % of Commercial Profits) 0.029** 0.029** 0.072*** 0.070*** 
 (2.39) (2.43) (5.06) (4.89) 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
  Log(Time on Taxes) -0.179*** -0.178*** -0.043 -0.052 
 (-4.10) (-4.09) (-0.94) (-1.14) 
  Log(# of Taxes) -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.074** -0.078** 
 (-8.07) (-8.08) (-2.24) (-2.35) 
  Government Effectiveness 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.111*** 0.114*** 
 (7.26) (7.20) (4.46) (4.56) 
  Quality of Business Regulation -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.096*** -0.097*** 
 (-4.14) (-4.12) (-5.74) (-5.91) 
  Control of Corruption -0.078*** -0.079*** -0.020 -0.022 
 (-5.62) (-5.63) (-0.94) (-1.03) 
  Rule of Law 0.001 0.001 0.059*** 0.060*** 
 (0.02) (0.09) (3.14) (3.17) 
  Voice and Accountability -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.061*** -0.058*** 
 (-5.94) (-5.93) (-5.23) (-4.99) 
  Infant Mortality Rate -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.001 0.001 
 (-5.07) (-5.07) (0.67) (0.56) 
  Access to Sanitation -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-8.21) (-8.15) (-4.49) (-4.38) 
  Log(GDP per Capita) -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.029*** -0.031*** 
 (-4.21) (-4.19) (-2.61) (-2.79) 
  Log(GDP) 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (10.75) (10.65) (6.62) (6.63) 
Constant 0.153 0.146 -0.482*** -0.428*** 
 (1.27) (1.21) (-4.32) (-3.71) 
     
Industry Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,502 15,502 14,597 14,597 
R-squared 0.137 0.137 0.167 0.167 
*,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
All p-values are in parentheses and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by country and industry. 
All variables are as defined in Appendix D.  
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